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LUCIAN AND DECLAMATION1 
WILLIAM GUAST 
Despite a growth in Lucianic commentary in recent decades,2 the declamations in 
the Lucianic corpus have thus far received very little scholarly attention.3 But given 
the virulent attacks on rhetoric elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus, it is something of 
a surprise to find Lucian declaiming. Scholars have usually explained this apparent 
contradiction by means of the literary periodization that Lucian’s works themselves 
expound (below, pp. 6–8), assigning the declamations to what is described as an 
earlier, rhetorical phase of his career. But literary periodization, even or especially 
literary self-periodization, has rightly come to be regarded as problematic by 
scholars (especially since John Moles’ 1978 article on Dio).4 In this paper, I reject 
periodization for Lucian’s career also. I focus on one of Lucian’s declamations, the 
Tyrannicida,5 and seek to show through close reading that this work is at least as at 
home in the corpus as most others: that when read closely, and in particular, when 
read against Choricius’ version of the same scenario (Choricius Declamationes 7),6 
this declamation emerges as a witty, insightful, and truly Lucianic perversion of a 
major contemporary cultural phenomenon. 
I. LYCINUS7 ON RHETORIC 
The Lucianic persona is not, generally speaking, well-disposed to contemporary 
rhetoric.8 The clearest example of this is obviously the Rhetorum Praeceptor, but 
similar complaints can be found all over the corpus, particularly in the Piscator, 
Pseudologista, and Lexiphanes. There are attacks narrowly concentrated on stylistic 
issues, as well as broader attacks on the associated culture. Stylistically, the bad 
teacher of rhetoric of the Rhetorum Praeceptor propounds superficial, outdated, or 
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even simply incorrect Atticism (16, 17, 18, 20), ignorance of the classics (17), 
random ordering of one’s material (18), and superfluous exempla and comparisons 
(18, 20); the prescription of the good teacher of rhetoric — absurdly rigid 
prescriptivism and the relentless study of outdated and worthless classics (9–10) — 
is hardly much better. To the Rhetorum Praeceptor’s list of failings, Lycinus in the 
Lexiphanes adds choosing words before thoughts, and fitting the latter to the former 
(24): this might sound like a criticism of the overuse of figures, but the example 
given — an incorrect use of the word θυμάλωψ (“piece of burning wood”) — is 
another instance of excessive and ignorant Atticism. In the Pseudologista, the 
declamations of Lucian’s opponent, perhaps the sophist Hadrian of Tyre,9 are 
attacked as ἕωλα (“stale”) (5) and cobbled together from the declamations of others 
(5–6; 25); as a specific example of a stylistic failing reference is made to an alleged 
occasion on which Hadrian, presumably playing the part of a husband discovering 
his wife committing adultery, asked not for a sword but a trident to dispatch the 
three lovers that he had found in her bed (29). 
In the Rhetorum Praeceptor, the whole culture associated with rhetoric 
comes under fire.10 Rhetoric is imagined as pursued solely for the sake of fame (1, 
6, 13, 25, 26), wealth (6), and power (6, 26); its practitioners are arrogant (13, 19, 
21, 22), effeminate and obsessed with their appearances (11, 12, 15, 16, 20, 23, 26), 
sexually immoral (23), and corrupt (21, 25); they are said to need ἀμαθία 
(“ignorance,”) θράσος (“audacity,”) τόλμαν (“daring,”) and ἀναισχυντίαν 
(“shamelessness”) (15, 24). The Piscator offers a similar picture, describing the 
δυσχερῆ (“disagreeable aspects”) of rhetoric as ἀπάτην καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ 
θρασύτητα καὶ βοὴν καὶ ὠθισμούς (“deception and lying and audacity and 
3 
 
shouting and altercations”) (29), while the Lexiphanes talks of ὁ τῦφος δὲ καὶ ἡ 
μεγαλαυχία καὶ ἡ κακοήθεια καὶ τὸ βρενθύεσθαι καὶ λαρυγγίζειν 
(“vanity and arrogance and malice and haughtiness and shouting”) (24). 
What is being attacked in all these passages is clearly the culture of 
declamatory rhetoric that Philostratus so memorably describes in the Vitae 
Sophistarum. Sometimes declamation is referred to specifically. At Bis Accusatus 
32, Lycinus disparages τυράννων κατηγορίας (“denunciations of tyrants”) and 
ἀριστέων ἐπαίνους (“encomia of war heroes,”) both mainline topics of 
declamation often used by synecdoche to refer to the whole genre.11 In the 
Lexiphanes, Lycinus identifies his target as τῶν ὀλίγον πρὸ ἡμῶν γενομένων 
σοφιστῶν τὰ φαυλότατα (“the utterly worthless products of those who were 
sophists a little before our time”) (Lexiphanes 23): while the literary output of a 
sophist was generally much broader than declamation alone, the genre of 
declamation is undoubtedly included in such a formulation. Rhetorum Praeceptor 
18–22 also clearly envisages a declamation performance of the sort so familiar from 
Philostratus, with the audience suggesting the theme, the declamation delivered ex 
tempore, frequent use of clichés from the Persian wars, lively banter between 
declaimer and audience, and even the controversial ᾠδή, the sung epilogue.12 The 
general stylistic comments are also clearly appropriate to declamation. Besides a 
few comments about the linguistic Atticism that was so dominant in this period, 
what seems to be targeted particularly is the more flamboyant rhetorical style 
exemplified by Polemo and Hadrian’s surviving declamations,13 as well as by 
numerous quotations in the Vitae Sophistarum. Abundant exempla are certainly 
characteristic of this style, and a part of what has been dubbed the “list style”;14 
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what Lycinus refers to as putting form before thought (Lexiphanes 24) would well 
describe the figures that are so prevalent and so obvious throughout Greek imperial 
declamation. With Hadrian’s alleged use of the trident image we might parallel 
imagery such as the sophist Nicetes’ ἐκ τῆς βασιλείου νεὼς Αἴγιναν 
ἀναδησώμεθα (“let us bind Aegina to the King’s ship”) (VS 513) or Polemo’s 
Cynegirus, sending his famous severed hands against the Persians as if they were 
naval expeditions (Polemo Callimachus 23). No rhetorician is known to have 
recommended random arrangement, but what the bad teacher of rhetoric prescribes 
has something in common with the looser structure of works like Polemo’s 
surviving declamations. This was probably a natural consequence of the exigencies 
of ex tempore composition: Polemo’s arrangement of ideas is certainly very 
different from the tight control exerted by Aristides, who steadfastly refused to 
“vomit” speeches ex tempore (VS 583). While many of these features are also to be 
found in the literature of this period outside declamation, it is in declamation that 
they seem to be found most frequently, and it may well have been from declamation 
that they spread to other genres. Beyond the style of declamation, the broader 
culture attacked in Lucian’s works is clearly that of declaiming sophists.15  
So: many works in the Lucianic corpus attack the style and broader 
associated culture of contemporary rhetoric — which means above all declamation 
— in particular at its more exuberant extremes. It is then at first sight surprising to 
find elsewhere in the corpus typical examples of declamation. Tyrannicide, for 
example, the subject of the Tyrannicida, is, as we have seen (not least in Lycinus’ 
own account, p. 3 with n. 11) one of the quintessential topics of declamation. In 
terms of argumentation, too, (admittedly a topic that we have not seen satirized in 
Lucian), the work uses the steps of argument that Hermogenes lays out for 
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declamations, such as this one, that turn on a definition (in this case, of what makes 
a tyrannicide).16 The subject of the Abdicatus is not quite so proverbial, but wicked 
stepmothers17 and disinheritance18 are certainly common among declamation 
themes, and their treatment — family disgrace masked by figured speech — is in 
accordance with that recommended by Ps.-Hermogenes’ De inventione, in which 
indeed family disgrace provides an exemplary case of when figured speech might 
be needed (IV.13.4, IV.13.13–19). Stylistically too, these two Lucianic 
declamations seem to correspond to the picture given — albeit in a more 
outrageously comic fashion — in works like the Rhetorum Praeceptor, with the 
Tyrannicida somewhat more exuberant than the Abdicatus. In both works we find 
an abundance of figures, particularly of the isocola of the list style. The disowned 
son describes his first disownment as: 
 
μῖσος ἄλογον καὶ νόμον ἀπηνῆ καὶ βλασφημίας προχείρους καὶ 
δικαστήριον σκυθρωπὸν καὶ βοὴν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ ὅλως χολῆς 
μεστὰ πάντα  
 
the senseless hatred and the harsh law and the easy abuse and the grim 
courtroom and the shouting and the anger and everything being full of bile 
(Abdicatus 3). 
 
Notice, in addition to the isocola, the sound effects (ἄλογον καὶ νόμον, ὅλως 
χολῆς), and the patterning within the list, with two shorter noun phrases (μῖσος 
ἄλογον καὶ νόμον ἀπηνῆ), two longer (βλασφημίας προχείρους καὶ 
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δικαστήριον σκυθρωπόν), and finally two nouns alone with homoeoteleuton 
(καὶ βοὴν καὶ ὀργήν). In the Tyrannicida, isocola are equally prevalent: the 
tyrant is called: 
 
ὁ τοὺς δορυφόρους συνέχων, ὁ τὴν φρουρὰν κρατύνων, ὁ τοὺς 
τυραννουμένους φοβῶν, ὁ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἐκκόπτων… ὁ 
τοὺς ἐφήβους ἀνασπῶν, ὁ ἐνυβρίζων τοῖς γάμοις  
 
the man who kept the bodyguard together, the man who strengthened the 
garrison, the man who frightened the subjects of the tyranny, the man who 
extirpated those plotting against him, the man who stole away young men, 
the man who committed outrage against marriages (5) 
 
More generally, this declamation is further pervaded by an insistent antithesis 
between two and one,19 and there is also an extended theatrical metaphor running 
through the work (below, p. 20–22). 
II. LUCIANIC (AUTO-)BIOGRAPHIES 
So: Lucian’s declamations present prime examples of the genre that is so virulently 
attacked in his other works. Now such inconsistencies within a literary persona are 
not uncommon, and have been dealt with in various ways. Glenn Most offers a 
typology of such approaches in his discussion of how scholars ancient and modern 
have sought to reconcile Sappho’s surviving poetry, largely homosexual in outlook, 
with a biographical tradition that considered her a paradigm of insatiable 
heterosexuality.20 The three strategies he identifies he calls “duplication,” 
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“narrativization,” and “condensation.” In duplication, perhaps the most extreme 
strategy, the troubling persona is split in half and its discrepant elements assigned 
to two authors. Thus we would have two Sapphos, one a poet, the other a prostitute; 
this indeed seems to have been the most popular approach in antiquity. Such a 
strategy has not, however, been adopted for Lucian. In part, this may be because 
the inconsistency is less stark in Lucian’s works (the anti-rhetorical material far 
outweighing the declamations in bulk and scholarly attention received), though of 
greater importance must surely be the attractiveness in Lucian’s case of what Most 
calls “narrativization.” Narrativization allows two mutually contradictory 
propositions (in this case, contempt for rhetorical culture, and the active practice of 
declamation) to be true of a single figure by assigning them to different periods in 
the author’s life. In the case of Lucian, such a solution seems at first glance to be 
authorized by Lucian’s works themselves. The most important passage comes in 
the Bis Accusatus (32), where Lycinus, defending himself against Rhetoric’s charge 
that he has abandoned her, says: 
 
καλῶς εἶχέ μοι ἀνδρὶ ἤδη τετταράκοντα ἔτη σχεδὸν γεγονότι 
θορύβων μὲν ἐκείνων καὶ δικῶν ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας 
τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀτρεμεῖν ἐᾶν, τυράννων κατηγορίας καὶ ἀριστέων 
ἐπαίνους ἐκφυγόντα 
 
It was right for me, as a man who was by now about forty years old, to give 
up those noisy lawsuits, and to leave the men of the jury in peace, shunning 




Here the reference to declamation is clear, as we said above (p. 3 with n. 11). This 
“conversion” is also referred to in the Piscator, though this time without any 
indication of date. Parrhesiades says: 
 
ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα συνεῖδον ὁπόσα τοῖς ῥητορεύουσιν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ 
δυσχερῆ προσεῖναι… ταῦτα μέν, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἦν, ἀπέφυγον  
 
as soon as I realised what disagreeable qualities speakers needed to 
acquire… as was reasonable, I avoided them (29) 
 
Elsewhere in the same work he is further referred to more briefly as ἀπολιπὼν τὰ 
δικαστήρια (“abandoning the courtrooms”) (25): the phrasing in this case does not 
rule out real forensic oratory in addition to declamation. 
Now this self-periodization has been so successful that few scholars have 
seen Lucian’s declaiming as a problem: it has readily been concluded that the 
declamations, and perhaps a few other works that incarnate specifically rhetorical 
forms, were written before Lucian was 40, the rest of his surviving works after the 
age of 40.21 Accordingly, it is considered that there is no inconsistency, and, given 
that the declamations come from a purely rhetorical phase of Lucian’s literary 
career, little of interest in these works (or rather, little of interest outside of pure 




Yet literary periodization of any kind is always suspect, as Moles 
convincingly showed for Dio, citing a number of other equally suspicious cases.22 
In reality, Lucian’s literary transformation was probably much less stark than is 
presented in the Bis Accusatus.23 The work was not intended as an objective account 
of Lucian’s literary development for the benefit of future scholars, and while its 
true purposes may be harder to divine, among the central concerns of this complex 
piece seems to be literary self-advertisement. The work advertises Lucian’s most 
innovative literary product, the satirical dialogue. Accordingly this innovation must 
be presented in the strongest terms possible — indeed, as a conversion, with Lucian 
formerly utterly uninterested in humour.24 The starkness of Lucian’s presentation 
is only sharpened by the romantic narrative that is used to dramatize the transition. 
If Rhetoric was his lover, then of course he must have been utterly devoted to her 
before he took up with someone else, with not a thought for comedy: semi-
abandonment does not make for a good romantic story.25 But it is prima facie 
implausible that a conversion from rhetoric to dialogue and satire would have been 
quite so swift, total, or irreversible: this is simply not how literary careers usually 
go. One does not generally develop a sense of humour overnight: it seems quite 
plausible that the satirical featured in Lucian’s output before any turn away from 
rhetoric. Equally, it is unlikely that whatever stimuli — whether artistic instincts or 
literary currents — induced Lucian to compose declamations before his conversion 
would have ceased entirely to be operative afterwards, even if they did now carry 
less weight with him: rhetoric continued to dominate literary production throughout 
Lucian’s lifetime and for centuries afterwards. Indeed, the vast bulk of Lucian’s 
works, most of which are usually assigned to the post-conversion period, show a 
strong rhetorical influence, even if they do not usually incarnate the forms 
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prescribed in rhetorical theory, such as declamations or encomia.26 Nor is there 
anything in this Bis Accusatus or the Piscator that rules out a return to rhetoric or 
rhetorical forms later in Lucian’s career.27 In short, it seems quite plausible that 
there were elements of satire in any “rhetorical” period of Lucian’s, and elements 
of rhetoric in any “post-rhetorical” period.28 If so, the inconsistency between 
declamation and anti-rhetorical satire would persist.  
Furthermore, there is actually a little positive evidence that Lucian 
continued to declaim after the shift described in the Bis Accusatus, and even that 
one of the surviving declamations (the Tyrannicida, on which we shall focus 
shortly) is from that period. For declamations were typically preceded by prolaliae, 
short introductory talks by the declaimer in propria persona: among Lucian’s 
prolaliae there are two, the Bacchus and the Hercules, that explicitly claim to be 
the products of the author’s old age (Bacchus 6–8; Hercules 7–8).29 Now while it 
is possible that these prolaliae were preludes to a performance of something other 
than declamation, it is hardly the most likely scenario: indeed, in the Hercules 
Lucian lays claim to oratorical powers. There is no real argument for such a 
conclusion beyond belief in a total rejection of rhetoric on Lucian’s part aged 40, 
which of course is the very point at issue. Furthermore (and this point is suggestive 
rather than decisive), the argumentation deployed in the Tyrannicida looks rather 
later than we would expect on the traditional Lucianic biography. Lucian must have 
been learning his rhetorical theory in something like 135–45, and if we assign the 
Tyrannicida to a rhetorical period, we cannot get it later than about 165. Yet (to use 
the terminology) the “division” (διαίρεσις) of the “issue” (στάσις) into what are 
called “headings” (κεφάλαια)30 in the Tyrannicida is actually closest to that 
prescribed by the theorist Hermogenes,31 whom Philostratus tells us (VS 577–78) 
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was fifteen when he performed for Marcus Aurelius (on what must have been the 
emperor’s eastern tour of 175/6) and so cannot possibly have been teaching in time 
for Lucian to have encountered his theories either as a student or before his alleged 
rejection of rhetoric.32 Of course, something like Hermogenes’ theories may have 
been floating around before Hermogenes, though we have enough evidence to know 
that the Tyrannicida would have looked somewhat different had Lucian been using 
the theory of the earlier theorist Zeno.33 
It seems, then, that we will not be able to resolve the conflict between 
Lucian’s declaiming and the anti-rhetorical views presented elsewhere in the corpus 
by means of narrativization.  
III. THE TYRANNICIDA 
Most’s third and final option for reconciling discrepant elements is “condensation.” 
In the case of Sappho, this means embracing the contradiction between vita and 
oeuvre as the rare achievement of a poetic temper, but we might usefully work with 
a broader notion of condensation as simply the acceptance of dissonance in an 
author. Why must literary personae be consistent at all? Real personalities, after all, 
are not always consistent: why should a literary persona, free(r) from the limitations 
of human psychology, be so? A weak form of Most’s condensation, then, may 
produce a Lucian or a Lucianic persona that if not totally consistent is nonetheless 
not intolerably divergent.  
Yet the search for consistency is not only generally speaking a very natural 
reading strategy (as reception history shows) but also in Lucian’s case one 
authorized by his texts themselves, which often purport to present (however 
elusively) the contents of their author’s mind (in the first person, or in the guise of 
Lycinus, The Syrian, or Parrhesiades), and which furthermore on occasion show 
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themselves concerned with questions of internal consistency (for example 
Apologia; Bis Accusatus). We should ask ourselves then whether the stronger form 
of condensation is not possible. I believe it is: I believe that when read closely, and 
in particular against Choricius’ version of the same theme (Choricius 
Declamationes 7), the Tyrannicida is revealed as complementary to the other 
Lucianic works concerned with rhetoric, such as the Rhetorum Praeceptor, not 
contradictory. I say only complementary, for the concerns of these works are not 
identical to those found in works like the Rhetorum Praeceptor. There are 
differences in first, subject matter and second, method. In terms of subject matter, 
hyperatticism is not in view here, nor the alleged random ordering adopted by 
declaimers, nor the alleged piles of irrelevant exempla. Figures do come under fire, 
though they are not the main target. The main target seems rather to be above all 
the contrivance involved in declamation: the extraordinary contortions through 
which a speaker must put himself to twist the bizarre data of any given declamation 
scenario in his favour. The method too has changed. What we find in the 
declamations is a subtler sort of humour, less commonly found in Lucian, and less 
celebrated. In this mode, a satirist slowly but relentlessly confounds our 
expectations of a genre until the work becomes absurd. The end result is something 
quieter but potentially even more potent than the outrageous incongruities of more 
obvious satire: the audience, who barely noticed as the work slipped imperceptibly 
into parody, suddenly find themselves stranded in absurdity, and as they wonder 
how a work that began in such a conventional fashion can have reached such a 
point, are made to realise the absurdity latent in the genre. Carried through 
effectively, such a lesson can fatally destabilize the audience’s ability to distinguish 
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between reality and parody, and in future call even the most conventional 
performance into question.34  
The closest parallel to the Tyrannicida and the Abdicatus in Lucian is 
perhaps the Hippias, a by-the-rules encomium of a bathhouse that lingers just a little 
too long on the trivia of its architecture and culminates bathetically in praise of, 
among other things, its two toilets (8): καὶ μή με ὑπολάβῃ τις μικρὸν ἔργον 
προθέμενον κοσμεῖν τῷ λόγῳ προαιρεῖσθαι (“and let no one suppose that I 
have taken a minor work as my subject, and that I purpose to dress it up with my 
eloquence,”) says the speaker with delicious disingenuousness. The Muscae 
Encomium shows a similar sort of humour, though its perversion of rhetoric is much 
more obvious, and much more pervasive; the de Syria Dea also, which hovers in 
critics’ judgements between parody, pastiche, satire, and mimicry35 might well 
belong to such a category, though there is not space to go into that much-debated 
work here. Such a mode of humour also has something in common with the two 
hoaxes that Galen tells us Lucian perpetuated.36 On the first occasion, Lucian is said 
to have forged a nonsensical work in the name of Heraclitus; on the second 
occasion, Lucian seems to have made up some linguistic examples. On both 
occasions, experts assumed the works were genuine and embarrassed themselves 
by producing ingenious explanations of the forged material. We also, as Gotthard 
Strohmaier points out, hear of Lucian committing forgeries in the extant corpus: he 
claims to have made up the story about Peregrinus’ soul going up to heaven in the 
form of a vulture (De mort. Peregr. 39–40) (readily believed, Lucian claims), and 
he and others sent frivolous questions of various sorts to the prophet Alexander, 
whose answers, according to Lucian, were of course themselves fake (Alex. 53–
54).37 Now while I do not think that the Tyrannicida was meant as a hoax per se, 
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the nature of these reported hoaxes — subtly, almost imperceptibly, yet ultimately 
fatally different from genuine works — is very similar to the sort of destabilizingly 
ambiguous parody of which I think the Tyrannicida is an example.38 
It is into such a category, then, that I propose to place Lucian’s Tyrannicida. 
It is no accident that this declamation seems so utterly conventional: by choosing 
such a common theme, developing the argumentation according to the traditional 
divisions, and adopting a typically declamatory style, with numerous figures and 
elaborate theatrical imagery, this work can take aim, by a kind of synecdoche, at 
the declamatory genre as a whole; indeed, the satire may be particularly potent for 
having initially lured the audience into the false expectation that this will be an 
entirely conventional declamation. 
As I have suggested, what is attacked above all in this work is the 
contrivance involved in producing a declamation. It begins with the declamation 
scenario, as often only a hair’s breadth away from novelistic romance. That 
declamation scenarios were absurd was in fact a common complaint in antiquity,39 
and is probably implicit also in the Bis Accusatus in the Syrian’s suggestion that it 
was καλῶς (“right”) for a man already about forty years old to stop declaiming: 
the idea seems to be that there is something rather childish40 about, among other 
things, the θορύβων (“uproar”) of declamation (32). Now the scenario for the 
Tyrannicida is as follows. A man sets off for the acropolis intending to assassinate 
the tyrant currently in power in his city. He fails to find the tyrant, but does find the 
tyrant’s son, whom he kills instead. When the tyrant discovers his son’s dead body, 
he takes the sword left in his son’s body by the speaker and kills himself. The 
speaker now claims the customary reward due to tyrannicides. Plenty of latent 
absurdity here: an incompetent and presumptuous tyrannicide indeed, who kills the 
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wrong man, apparently gives up the search for the tyrant, and then claims the reward 
regardless when the tyrant later commits suicide! To make this case, the speaker is 
forced to become entangled in multiple absurdities: that Lucian’s text plays on these 
absurdities rather than tactfully ignoring them (as it should) can be established by 
close comparison with Choricius’ version of the same declamation (Choricius 
Declamationes 7), which while impressive argumentatively, does not seem to show 
the same satirical spirit as Lucian’s. 
The right act, the wrong victim: to make his act as close to tyrannicide as 
possible, the speaker needs to play up the tyrannical qualities of the son and make 
him as much of a tyrant as his father. Choricius does: his speaker has overthrown 
δύο… δεσπότας (“two masters”) (7.1), δύο… τυράννων (“two tyrants”) (7.7), 
and δύο... τυραννίδας (“two tyrannies”) (89). To mitigate his failure to kill the 
tyrant himself, it might also make sense also to play down the tyrant’s own 
tyrannical qualities, and this Choricius also does, at least in relative terms. τοῦ 
τεκόντος ἐφύετο χείρων ὁ παίς (“the son was worse than the one who begot 
him”) (7.2) he says, arguing that to be born to tyranny is worse than to come to it 
later in life; δυεῖν ἄρα τῇ πόλει δεινῶν τὸ μέγα μὲν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ καταλέλυται, 
τὸ δὲ βραχὺ δι’ ἐμοῦ (“so of the two evils the city endured, the greater was ended 
by me, the lesser through me”) (7.3). Now the Chorician treatment brings out by 
contrast the exaggerated quality of the Tyrannicida. In outline, the two speeches 
pursue roughly the same strategy. In Lucian, the son’s crimes are stressed in what 
feels very much like a commonplace (κοινὸς τόπος) against a tyrant (5), with 
classic elements such as torture, confiscations, exile, and rape, and the idea of two 
tyrants is as pervasive in Lucian as it was in Choricius.41 And again, the sins of the 
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son (4) are said to have been greater than those of his father: at chapter 16 we hear 
υἱὸς ἦν τυράννου, μᾶλλον δὲ τύραννος χαλεπώτερος (“he was the tyrant’s 
son, or rather he was a more difficult tyrant.”) But as so often in this piece, Lucian’s 
version goes too far in mitigating the tyrant’s crimes: οὐ πάνυ τυραννικὸς αὐτός 
(“he wasn’t tyrannical at all himself”) (4) says the would-be tyrannicide of his 
tyrant; the tyrant ὅλως ἐτυραννεῖτο (“was wholly tyrannized”) (4) by his son; 
trying to make the most of his victory over the tyrant’s bodyguards, the tyrannicide 
finds himself arguing οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτός γε ὁ τύραννος μέγα καὶ δυσάλωτον 
καὶ δυσκατέργαστόν ἐστιν (“of course, it’s not the tyrant himself who is mighty 
and hard to catch and hard to overcome”) (15). What in particular tips these claims 
over the line into absurdity is the adverbial modifiers οὐ πάνυ (“not at all”) and 
ὅλως (“wholly”) and δή (“of course,”) as well as the typically declamatory paradox 
of using of the τυρανν- root in negating the tyrant’s crimes: declamation is here 
being dismantled with one of its own tools. If the tyrant was not in fact a tyrant in 
any sense, why on earth did the speaker set out to kill him? Why would it even 
matter then that the tyrant had subsequently committed suicide? It makes sense to 
play down the tyrant’s crimes, to be sure, but in Lucian they run the risk of being 
played down to the point of insignificance. 
But the act, whether tyrannicide or not, needs to be explained. Why when 
he had set out to rid the city of its tyrant did the speaker get side-tracked into killing 
his son? Why did he then give up his search for the tyrant? How — and Choricius 
identifies this as a particular weakness of the case in his preliminary theoretical 
discussion (protheoria) (6) — can the speaker claim a reward for a killing that he 
did not perform himself, or that was not a direct or likely consequence of his 
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actions? Furthermore — an objection that Choricius considers — was not the more 
likely consequence of killing the son but not the father an intensification of the 
tyranny as the bereaved tyrant sought revenge, rather than the tyrant’s suicide (51)? 
In Choricius, these objections are met with sensible counter-arguments. When he 
encountered the tyrant’s son, the speaker was, not unreasonably, overcome with 
anger at the son’s crimes and so decided to kill him on the spot (9–10). He gave up 
his quest to kill the tyrant only temporarily to share with the city his joy at the son’s 
death, and to win gratitude as the first to proclaim the good news (10–11). He 
intended, to be sure, τοῦτο ποιήσειν τὸν τύραννον, ὅπερ ἔφθη ποιήσας (“to 
do first to the tyrant what the tyrant in fact did,”) since οὐ … ἀνάλωσεν ὅλον 
μοι τὸν θυμὸν ἡ τοῦ μειρακίου σφαγή (“slaughtering the boy had not used up 
all my anger”) (11); he had the mens rea of a tyrannicide, and was only prevented 
by factors beyond his control from achieving the actus reus. Nonetheless, he still 
claims that the tyrant’s suicide followed closely and plausibly from his killing of 
the tyrant’s son, though he must work hard to do this: chapters 52–71 are given over 
to this argument, and it is seeded earlier in the piece by means of references to the 
tyrant’s devotion to his only son (4, 15, 26). 
The speaker of Lucian’s work, by contrast, avoids such sensible arguments. 
He gives no real explanation for how he got diverted into killing the tyrant’s son, 
though he almost certainly42 could have done so. Moreover, rather than claiming, 
as Choricius does, and again as he himself probably could have done, that he would 
have killed the tyrant had he not been prevented from doing so by factors beyond 
his control, he instead, after a brief suggestion that the tyrant was so pathetic as 
hardly to be worth killing (8) (which would again raise the question of why his 
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killing was to be attempted at all, let alone celebrated or rewarded), he makes the 
much more difficult and indeed implausible claim that he deliberately did not kill 
the tyrant because he knew that what he had done thus far would inevitably lead to 
the tyrant’s death: πάντως τὸ ἐσόμενον αὐτὸ προεμαντευόμην (“I 
prophesied exactly what was going to happen in every respect”) (13); εὐθὺς 
ἠπιστάμην τεθνηξόμενον αὐτόν (“I knew that he was going to die at once”) 
(18). Again, it is the adverbs — πάντως (“in every way,”) εὐθύς (“immediately”) 
— that tip this over the line into implausibility; the choice of the rather poetic verb 
προμαντεύομαι (“I prophesy”) (13), instead something more prosaic like 
προοράω (“I foresee”) or προνοέω (“I anticipate”) only heightens the 
implausibility of this claim. Once again, Lucian’s speaker goes too far and makes a 
much less credible claim than we find in Choricius: in Choricius, no stronger 
conclusion was dared in support of the speaker’s claim to have caused the tyrant’s 
death than that it was τοῖς ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ γενομένοις οὐκ ἀνάρμοστον (“not out of 
harmony with what had been done by me”) (58).43 
Now Lucian’s speaker’s claim is already so overstated that almost any 
argument supporting the idea that the tyrant’s death followed inevitably from the 
death of the son runs the risk of undermining his case, but even so, once again, his 
supporting arguments are very weak, and weaker than those offered by Choricius. 
The greatest weakness is simply in terms of scale: in Choricius the link between the 
two deaths is argued closely over the course of nineteen chapters (52–71); Lucian’s 
work by contrast only gives a few chapters to this question. Obviously, Lucian’s 
piece is shorter than that of Choricius, but given how complex the issue is, the 
decision (and it must have been a decision) to give them insufficient space 
19 
 
necessarily weakens the case. Brevity, perhaps, is in this case part of satire: by 
shrinking the object of one’s mockery, one robs it of its force; indeed, the closest 
pieces in the corpus to the Tyrannicida and the Abdicatus, the Hippias and Muscae 
Encomium, are also much shorter than typical examples of their genre would be. 
Now in Lucian we find at least one supporting argument that is also used in 
Choricius: that the tyrant’s love for his son made his suicide more likely (Choricius 
Declamationes 7.52–72, Lucian Tyrannicida 18, with hints at 9 and 11); on the 
other hand, the Tyrannicida omits to argue, as Choricius does (Declamationes 7.17, 
27, 68–70), that the tyrant might have feared that he would be next, and sought to 
forestall his assassination by taking his own life first. But Lucian’s speaker’s main 
supporting argument is quite unexpected: he claims that he deliberately mutilated 
the tyrant’s son’s body πολλοῖς τραύμασιν ἐς τὰ φανερά (“with many wounds 
to the visible parts”) (20) — a grotesque image — in order to cause his father the 
maximum possible pain. But he does not stop there: after explicitly saying that he 
was not present to witness the tyrant’s suicide (ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀπηλλαττόμην (“for I 
had withdrawn”) (20)), Lucian’s tyrannicide has the effrontery to have the tyrant 
conveniently frame himself at the moment of death as being the victim of 
tyrannicide, crying out in a splendidly polysyllabic utterance 
τετυραννοκτονήμεθα (“we are the victims of tyrannicide!”) (20), and, in a final 
apostrophe to the sword, τυραννοκτόνησον (“commit tyrannicide!”) (21).44 This 
is wildly implausible, and obviously too good to be true: its exaggerated quality 
reveals the contrivance of the speaker, casting doubt even on the more plausible 
things that have been said so far. Ultimately, claims the speaker, in the biggest 
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paradox of the piece, τὸν τύραννον ἀπέκτεινα ἑτέρῳ φόνῳ (“I killed the tyrant 
by slaying someone else”) (17).  
Finally, in Choricius we find here and there the bolder suggestion that the 
tyrant’s suicide was actually a better result than a more conventional tyrannicide, 
because it is more painful to kill oneself having seen one’s own son killed (23) and 
because with both father and son dead the tyranny is definitely over (25–26; 55). 
Both of these arguments appear in Lucian,45 but once again are pushed too far: what 
happened is claimed to have been the best possible outcome: ὡς ἐνῆν ἄριστα 
διεπραξάμην (“I accomplished it in the best possible way”) (17); ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ 
γενόμενον μικρότερον ἦν· νῦν δὲ λαμπρότερόν ἐστι τῇ καινότητι (“if it 
had been done by me, it would have been a lesser deed. As things are, it is more 
glorious by reason of its novelty”) (22). Note particularly the addition of καινότης 
(“novelty,” “freshness”) to the reasons given for preferring what actually happened, 
as if anyone living under tyranny would worry about the aesthetic merits of a 
proposed means of tyrannicide!46  
So much for the argumentation. Lucian’s perversion of the declamatory 
genre is supported also by the extended theatrical metaphor found in the work.47 
This first appears in chapter 8, at the end of the narration, where it is said that the 
tyrant by his death τέλος ἐπέθηκε τῷ ἐμῷ δράματι (“provided the ending to 
my play,”) and then at length in the ekphrasis that concludes the work (20–21). 





ποιητὴς μὲν τῆς ὅλης τραγῳδίας γεγενημένος, καταλιπὼν δὲ τῷ 
ὑποκριτῇ τὸν νεκρὸν καὶ τὴν σκηνὴν καὶ τὸ ξίφος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ 
τοῦ δράματος 
 
having become the playwright of the whole tragedy, and having left behind 
for the actor the body and the set and the sword and the other parts of a play 
(20) 
 
When the tyrant looks for his son, he looks for a sword, πάλαι δὲ ἦν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ 
καὶ τοῦτο προπαρεσκευασμένον (“but even this had long ago been prepared 
in advance by me”) (21); finally, at the very end of the speech he says: 
 
μεμέρισται δὲ ἐς πολλοὺς τὸ ἔργον ὥσπερ ἐν δράματι· καὶ τὰ μὲν 
πρῶτα ἐγὼ ὑπεκρινάμην, τὰ δεύτερα δὲ ὁ παῖς, τὰ τρίτα δὲ ὁ 
τύραννος αὐτός, τὸ ξίφος δὲ πᾶσιν ὑπηρέτησεν 
 
the deed has been divided among many, like in a play: I acted the first part, 
the tyrant’s son the second, and the tyrant himself the third, and the sword 
served us all (22) 
 
The scenario too, has something of the flavour of Greek tragedy about it, with the 
discovery of dead bodies (20) and apostrophes of swords (twice: 19 & 21). Now 
this dramatic metaphor is a good choice for a speaker who wants to claim that he 
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was in control of events: he didn’t kill the tyrant himself, but he as it were wrote 
the script that the tyrant followed. But the metaphor, as often in this work, makes 
claims that might be considered stronger than is prudent in terms of strict 
persuasion. The tyrant’s death took more than simply leaving a sword around for 
him to use, and the tyrant was not of course following the tyrannicide’s script. What 
is intended as a metaphor stressing the speaker’s control over events instead, on 
account of the implausibly extravagant claims it implies, ends up highlighting not 
the speaker’s close control over events but rather the artificiality of his claims. It is 
further interesting to note Quintilian’s assertion that if declamation were not 
preparation for real oratory (as is sometimes alleged in our sources, n. 39), it would 
be mere scaenicae ostentationi (Inst. 2.10.8). If such an image was at all common 
in the criticism of declamation, then its use here by a declaimer further undermines 
the work.48 
Theatrical imagery is not the only means by which attention is drawn to the 
contrivance of this work. For this declamation also makes reference to the rhetorical 
theory that has shaped it — a feature we might call “metarhetoric” — with almost 
unparalleled explicitness. The most glaring piece of metarhetoric is the words ἀπ’ 
ἀρχῆς ἐς τέλος (“from beginning to end”) (14),49 which is used by the speaker of 
his second, more analytical narrative (14–18). This phrase clearly evokes one of the 
headings in Hermogenes’ canonical divisions of the different issues: τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς 
ἄχρι τέλους, conventionally translated as the “sequence of events,” that is a 
narration of what happened (with appropriate rhetorical slanting) (for example De 
statibus III.10–11). As (inter alia) the first heading in the division of the first issue 
(conjecture) in Hermogenes,50 one imagines that this term would have been 
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particularly familiar to those who had been through a rhetorical education. 
Technical too, though a little less glaring, is the speaker’s indignant rejection of the 
thought that his action might be ἀτελῆ (“incomplete”) (9):51 in Hermogenes (De 
statibus II.2), ἀτελῆ (“incomplete”) actions, somehow deficient instances of a 
given crime, are the ones about which the stasis of definition arises. Three times the 
speaker also refers to the allegation that his deed was lacking in some respect: 
though the vocabulary he uses (ἐνδεῖν (“to be lacking”: 10, 11, 14) is not found in 
Hermogenes, this is precisely the conception of incomplete actions that we find in 
Hermogenes; the unusual abstraction with which the idea is stated here brings it 
close to metarhetoric. This metarhetoric works together with the theatrical imagery 
to break repeatedly the dramatic illusion and, by laying bare the guts of the rhetoric, 
further expose the contrivance involved in producing a declamation. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This article, then, has suggested two new contexts in which to read the Tyrannicida, 
and will finish by offering a third. First, it (re-)situates the work among a group of 
Lucianic texts such as the Hippias or the forged Heraclitan piece, works that fatally 
undermine various sorts of cultural products by producing imitations that are close 
to the real thing yet flawed in small but devastating ways. The other declamations 
in the Lucianic corpus (Phalaris 1 and 2 and the Abdicatus), are, I think, just as 
amenable to readings of this sort: the Abdicatus, in particular, seems designed to 
show what happens when figured speech goes too far. Second, as regards theme, I 
suggest that the Tyrannicida should been seen as complementary to the other 
Lucianic works concerned with rhetoric, such as the Rhetorum Praeceptor, not 
contradictory: generally speaking it agrees with them in its low estimation of 
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rhetoric, and it shares some of their more specific concerns, but it focuses in 
particular on the argumentative contortions a declaimer had to go through to make 
his case. Finally, as regards the wider social position of Lucian’s declamations, I 
suggest that the Tyrannicida would be most fruitfully grouped — not least on 
account of its close evocation of contemporary issue theory — with satirical works 
that offer comment on major cultural phenomena of the day, such as the de historia 
conscribenda, the de morte Peregrini, or the Alexander. On all three counts, it 
stands as an eminently Lucianic work. 
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publication. 
1 All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. I use Macleod’s (1972–
1987) text of Lucian. For Choricius, I use the text of Foerster and Richtsteig (1929); 
Choricius’ surviving declamations have all been translated in a collection edited by 
Penella (2009). I cite Aphthonius, Hermogenes, and Ps.-Hermogenes according to 
the editions of Patillon (2008; 2009; 2012). 
2 E.g. Nesselrath 1985; Weißenberger 1996; Georgiadou and Larmour 1998; von 
Möllendorff 2000; Lightfoot 2003; Pilhofer et al. 2005; Hopkinson 2008; 
Camerotto 2009. 
3 We have four declamations by Lucian: the Tyrannicida and the Abdicatus, which 
both use scenarios very typical of the genre (nn. 17–18, below), and Phalaris 1 and 
Phalaris 2, which are rather more unusual. For Greek declamation generally, see 
Russell 1983. There are brief analyses of the Tyrannicida and Abdicatus in terms 
of rhetorical theory in Bompaire 1958, 242–6, and Heath 1995, 175–8, but 
otherwise almost nothing in major works such as Helm 1906; Baldwin 1973; 
Anderson 1976; Hall 1981; Bracht Branham 1989; Billault 1994. The reading that 
I will offer of the Tyrannicida has been very briefly adumbrated in a few places, 
e.g. “il frutto… di una incipiente, larvata parodia della retorica” (Longo 1976–1993, 
2:197), “Lucian’s approach to declamation [in the Abd.] has a characteristic 
lightness of touch; this is even more in evidence in his Tyrannicide, with its many 
tongue-in-cheek moments” (Berry and Heath 1997, 414); for Karavas (2005), 194, 
the Tyrannicida is “un opuscule… ironique”; Tomassi writes “it cannot be ruled out 




                                                                                                                                                               
repeating arguments in the interest of form rather than content” (Tomassi 2015b 
254; cf. Tomassi 2015a, 359). 
4 Moles 1978. 
5 For Lucian’s other declamations, see p. 23. 
6 For Choricius’ Tyrannicida, see Tomassi 2014; 2015b; 2015a. Tomassi compares 
the declamatory tyrants of Lucian, Choricius, and others, but his comparison is quite 
different in focus and conclusions from my own. Tomassi (2015a, 341) describes 
Lucian’s piece as “un intrattenimento letterario raffinato,” and concludes that 
Lucian makes a “considerable effort to vary a unitary scholastic model,” 
“combining the Platonic conception of the tyrant, which consisted in a certain 
attitude and a particular way of life, and Xenophon’s image of the tyrant,” with the 
latter defined as a “statesman trapped in his role, forced to give up the freedom of 
a private citizen”; he further argues that the Lucian’s depiction of the relationship 
between the tyrant and his son makes the declamation “intensely dramatic” and 
makes the tyrant less isolated than usual (Tomassi 2015b, 253; cf. Tomassi 2015a 
356–7). Choricius’ declamation, meanwhile, is said to show “an intensification of 
the literary aspects of declamation,” exploring “character and psychological 
motivation” (Tomassi 2015b, 262). Tomassi also enumerates some of Choricius’ 
debts to Lucian in terms of phrasing and argument (Tomassi 2015a, 357–9; cf. 
Tomassi 2015b, 227 n. 52, 228). 
7 Lycinus is one of several personae found in Lucian’s works (along with “The 
Syrian,” “Parrhesiades” (“Free-Speaker,”) “Tychiades” (“Man of fortune,”) and 
“Momus” (“Blame”)) that “flaunt the possibility of identity with the author, but 
deny the certainty or completeness of this connection” (Ní-Mheallaigh 2010, 129). 




                                                                                                                                                               
8 Zweimüller’s (2008, esp. 93–107) introduction to her commentary on the 
Rhetorum Praeceptor offers a wide-ranging survey of attitudes to rhetoric in 
Lucian’s work. 
9 For the debate, and bibliography, see Janiszewski, Stebnicka, and Szabat 2015, 
390–1. 
10 See Gibson 2012 for the Rhetorum Praeceptor as a “parodic inversion” (93) of 
everything that ancient students’ teachers held dear. 
11 ἀριστέων ἢ τυραννοκτόνων ἢ πενήτων ἢ γεωργῶν (“war-heroes or 
tyrant-killers or poor men or famers,”) Lucian Salt. 65; τοὺς πένητας 
ὑπετυπώσατο καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους καὶ τοὺς ἀριστέας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους 
(“[the second sophistic] sketched poor men and rich men and war-heroes and 
tyrants,”) Philostr. VS 481. Cf. also Juv. 7.150–4: tyrannicide is crambe repetita 
(“rehashed cabbage,” trans. Braund 2004, 311), and such material occidit 
magistros. On the place of tyrants in sophistic rhetoric, see Malosse 2006. 
12 Civiletti 2002, 387 n. 29. 
13 Polemo: Reader 1996. Hadrian: Hinck 1873. 
14 Innes and Winterbottom 1988, 10. 
15 For example, the bad teacher of rhetoric’s recommendation of numerous love 
affairs (Rhetorum Praeceptor 23) matches the lively sex lives of many sophists 
reported in the VS (486, 489, 513, 517, and 599). 
16 For the use by Lucian of the sort of theory we find in Hermogenes, see Heath 
1995, 175–8; Bompaire 1958, 242–6. For the definition of tyrannicide, see 
Sopater’s discussion of the cases at Walz VIII.95.21–98.11 and 98.12–100.17. See 




                                                                                                                                                               
17 Hermogenes’ two scenarios involving stepmothers (Hermog. De statibus 
III.39.3–5, III.45.3–5) frequently recur in discussions by later rhetoricians. For 
mentions of the former, see Walz IV.86.14–17, 211.17–18, 447.26–450.28, 
V.86.18–20, 140.20–22, VII.135.2–4, 180 n. 15, 362.12–14, 367.8–28, VIII.28.5–
7; for the latter, see Walz IV.207.21–2, 211.6–7, 301 n. 36, 357.27–8, 465.19–
468.15, 700 n.6, V.85.27–8, VII.180 n. 15, 182.15–16, 390.11–12, VIII.77.25–9; 
Syrianus In Hermogenem commentaria II.63.13–14; 150.5–18 Rabe. That both are 
older than Hermogenes is suggested by their presence in Sulpicius Victor (Rhet. 
Lat. Min. 327.33–5, 334.30–1), and therefore probably in the earlier Zeno (see n. 
33). 
18 Scenarios involving disinheritance are too common to list in full: see e.g. 
Hermog. De statibus (II.5.8–9, II.12.6–10 (=X.6.2–5), III.9.3–5 (= III.12.5–6), and 
one defective scenario, I.21.1–2); Ps.-Hermogenes De inventione (I.1.14.1–6, 
IV.13.14.1–5, IV.13.16.3–6, IV.13.18.3–6); Sopater Rhetor Diaireseis Zētēmatōn 
(Walz VIII.78.22–25, 124.18–20, 175.11–14, 227.24–5, 244.10–11, 270.6–8, 
336.3–4). As in the case of the stepmother scenarios, Hermogenes’ examples of 
disinheritance are discussed extensively by later rhetoricians: for discussions of the 
case treated at De statibus II.12.6–10 (=X.6.2–5) see Heath 1995, 145. 
19 δύο τυράννους… μιᾶς ἡμέρας; μίαν… ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέροις… δωρεὰν; 
πληγῇ μιᾷ δύο πονηροὺς ἀποσκευασάμενος (“two tyrants… in one day”; 
“one reward for both deeds”; “having done away with two scoundrels with one 
blow”) (1); ἁπλῆν… τυραννίδα… μίαν δουλείαν.. οὐδὲ ἑνὸς... δεσπότου; 
δύο ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς τυράννους (“a single tyranny… one slavery… nor of one 




                                                                                                                                                               
20 Most 1996, 11–35. 
21 E.g. Helm 1906, 11; Hall 1981, 58–9, 459. 
22 Moles 1978. 
23 For a full discussion of Lucian’s literary conversion, with bibliography, see Braun 
1994, 279–306. 
24 “Conversions as such are a sensational enough rhetorical gesture” (Anderson 
1982, 85). 
25 For more reasons to be suspicious of the conversion narrative on literary grounds, 
see Jones 1986, 12–14. Anderson (1982, 85) also suggests that Lucian’s self-
presentation here may have been “largely dictated” by Cratinus’ Pytinē. 
26 “More spurious still is the claim that he abandoned rhetoric for philosophy; still 
less did he ever abandon law-courts and τυράννων κατηγορίας, which are rife 
throughout the extant works” (Anderson 1982, 85). 
27 Hall (1981, 58–9) sensibly imagines a by no means implausible scenario in which 
Lucian penned a few declamations in old age to show that he still could when it was 
suggested by others that he abandoned the genre through lack of ability. 
28 Thus Piot: “Mais… il n’a jamais su se dépendre de l’idéal d’art qu’il avait admiré 
dans sa jeunesse et suivi jusqu’aux confins de sa maturité. S’il a délaissé le domaine 
conventionnel et les thèmes ordinaires de la sophistique courante… il restait un 
rhéteur… il changeait de matière, il n’a pas complètement change de manière” 
(italics Piot’s) (Piot 1914, 8). 
29 Piot 1914, 8–9. 
30 “Issue” (στάσις) refers to the fundamental dispute in any given case, such as 
whether or not the crime took place at all (the issue of “conjecture,” στοχασμός), 




                                                                                                                                                               
the best classification of these acts (the issue of “definition,” ὅρος, as in Lucian’s 
Tyrannicida). The division (διαίρεσις) breaks the issue down into “headings” 
(κεφάλαια), which are steps of argument appropriate to the sort of case in 
question. 
31 n. 16. 
32 For Hermogenes’ biography, see Janiszewski, Stebnicka, and Szabat 2015, 165–
6. 
33 Zeno’s division lacks the headings of “assimilation” (συλλογισμός) and 
“importance” (πηλικότης), and adds an extra heading at the end (Rhet. Lat. Min. 
336–7). For Zeno’s dates and the faithful transmission of his theories in the Latin 
of Sulpicius Victor, see Heath 2004, 24–5; Janiszewski, Stebnicka, and Szabat 
2015, 384. 
34 The phenomenon I am describing therefore has more than a little in common with 
contemporary “mockumentaries” such as The Office or In the Thick of It. 
35 Lightfoot 2003, 197–9. 
36 Strohmaier 1976, 117–122. 
37 Macleod 1979, 326. 
38 On Lucian’s frauds, see also Anderson 1982, 71–4. A parallel from the “First 
Sophistic” might be Gorgias’ Hel., or his On What Is Not: scholars still argue about 
how seriously to take the latter, and about the precise meaning of Gorgias’ 
description of the former as a παίγνιον. Gorgias of course is for Philostratus the 
“father” of the first sophistic (VS 481) and of ex tempore oratory (VS 482–3); among 
imperial writers, Proclus in his prolaliae is said to have resembled Gorgias (VS 




                                                                                                                                                               
39 The most famous such complaint can be found at Petron. Sat. 1: Et ideo ego 
adulescentulos existimo in scholis stultissimos fieri, quia nihil ex his, quae in usu 
habemus, aut audiunt aut vident, sed piratas cum catenis in litore stantes, sed 
tyrannos edicta scribentes quibus imperent filiis ut patrum suorum capita 
praecidant, sed responsa in pestilentiam data ut virgines tres aut plures immolentur 
(“and I think that students become utterly stupid at school, because they don’t hear 
or see anything from everyday life, but rather pirates standing on the shore with 
chains, or tyrants writing edicts in which they order sons to cut off the heads of their 
own fathers, or oracular responses given in the face of a plague saying that three or 
more virgins should be buried alive.”) Similar complaints can be found at Tac. Dial. 
35 and Quint. Inst. 2.10.5. 
40 Cf. Sen. Controv. 3 preface 13 hac puerili exercitatione. 
41 Commonplaces against tyrants are illustrated by Lib. Progymnasmata 7.4 and 
Apth. Prog. VII.3–11. For the classic qualities of a tyrant, see Lanza 1977, and, on 
the tyrant in Latin declamation, see Tabacco 1985. 
42 We do not know how faithfully the preface now attached to the Tyrannicida 
represents the scenario that Lucian was declaiming (such paratextual elements are 
particularly uncertain textually), but it is hard to imagine that a reason could not 
have been found. Many declamation scenarios seem to be phrased in a laconic 
fashion precisely in order to provide the challenge of creatively filling-in the gaps 
in the case to suit the rhetorical needs of the situation, particularly when it came to 
actors’ motivations. 
43 It also seems foolish for Lucian’s speaker to raise the potential objection 
ἠκολούθησε δέ τι τέλος ἄλλως χρηστόν, ἐμοῦ μὴ θελήσαντος (“a result 




                                                                                                                                                               
Harmon 1936, 459) (13). This is rejected, of course, but is a strong point, as 
Choricius says, and its placement right before the claim to absolute knowledge of 
the future makes it particularly harmful to the speaker’s argument. 
44 The idea of tyrant as tyrannicide occurs first, in the speaker’s voice, in chapter 8 
(ἐτυραννοκτόνησεν “he [the tyrant] slew the tyrant,” trans. Harmon 1936, 453). 
45 A more painful death: Tyrannicida 1, 17–18 (where it is implausibly claimed that 
for the tyrant to have been killed by the would-be tyrannicide would have been 
εὐκταιότατον... αὐτῷ “his fondest prayer” (17), trans. Harmon 1936, 465), 20 
(where with implausible convenience the tyrant is made to say that being allowed 
to live to see his son dead is worse than being killed straightaway). End of tyranny: 
3, 6, 16. 
46 Cf. also τὸν τρόπον ἐκαινοτόμησα τῆς τῶν πονηρῶν τελευτῆς (2), and 
παραδοξότατον (1). For sophistry’s characteristic interest in novelty, see 
Whitmarsh 2005, 36–7.  
47 Tomassi 2015b, 253–4; Tomassi 2015a, 359 n. 51. 
48 Such imagery was of course frequently used as a positive image for their 
performances by the sophists themselves, e.g. Wright 1921, 574 on σκηνή (which 
she renders as “outfit” or “getup.”) Once again, Lucian (and Quintilian) pervert the 
master’s tools. 
49 Heath 1995, 178. 
50 Though the issue of Lucian’s declamation is “definition,” not “conjecture,” there 
is nothing to stop the headings of one issue being used in another, and indeed the 
heading προβολή (“presentation,” trans. Heath (1995, 258)) in definition and other 




                                                                                                                                                               
(“sequence of events,” trans. Heath (1995, 259)) (De statibus IV.2.1–2). Extant 
declamations are frequently seen to borrow headings in this way. 
51 Heath 1995, 177. 
